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Nature of the Case 
Ronald Bird appeals from his Judgment of Conviction Commitment for 
sexual abuse of a child following a jury trial. On appeal, Mr. Bird asserts that the district 
court erred in determining that Idaho Rule of Evidence 412 applied to bar presentation 
of his proffered evidence that the alleged victim was curious about anatomy and had 
seen her brother's penis, and when it excluded the evidence because it determined that 
it constituted alternative source evidence. 
Additionally, Mr. Bird that the district court (1) violated his right to due 
rocess by punishing him for exercising his constitutional right to to participate in 
the psychosexual examination, (2) abused discretion when it imposed his sentence 
because it considered, as an aggravating factor, that Mr. Bird refused to participate in 
the psychosexual evaluation, and (3) abused its discretion when it imposed an 
excessive sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Bird, a long-time resident of Rexburg, is 82 years old. (Tr., p.620, Ls.14-25.) 
He has lived in the same house for 30 years. (Tr., p.620, Ls.4-7.) One day, two 
neighborhood children, four-year-old E.W. and her five-year-old brother, T.W., came 
into Mr. Bird's backyard while he was picking up pinecones and helped him pick up the 
pinecones. (Tr., p.623, L.17 - p.624, L.16.) Mr. Bird gave them candy for helping. 
(Tr., p.624, Ls.14-16.) After that day, E.W. and T.W. consistently visited Mr. Bird to help 
with whatever he was working on and he would give them candy. (Tr., p.624, Ls.21-25.) 
Mr. Bird told them they could only have two pieces a day because he did not want them 
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to fill up on candy. (Tr., p.624, Ls.23-25.) E.W. and T.W. also went to other neighbor's 
houses and asked for candy. (Tr., p.556, Ls.4-16.) There were five or six times when 
E.VV. brought other neighborhood children to Mr. Bird's house to get candy. (Tr., p.625, 
Ls.1-7.) E.W. and T.W. visited Mr. Bird about three times a week and would often just 
walk into his house and watch TV with him. (Tr., p.625, Ls.18-20, p.626, L.15 p.627, 
L.23.) 
On one occasion, Mr. Bird came home from Idaho Falls to find E.W. watching 
television on his couch. (Tr., p.630, Ls.5-10.) Mr. Bird went into his bedroom and was 
putting on his pants when E.W. walked into the bedroom. (Tr., p.630, Ls.15-18, p.657, 
Ls.22-25.).) E.W. asked Mr. Bird if he had a "wee-wee" and he said that he did. 
(Tr., p.630, Ls.18-24.) E.W. then grabbed Mr. Bird's penis and twisted it. (Tr., p.631, 
Ls.1-2.) Mr. Bird testified at trial that he never asked or encouraged E.W. to touch him. 
(Tr., p.619, L.20 - p.646, L.9.) A similar incident occurred later that night when Mr. Bird 
was in his living room. (Tr. p.631, Ls.12-16.) It was late at night and E.W. came in 
through his kitchen to his living room and started watching TV. (Tr., p.631, Ls.17-25.) 
Mr. Bird was leaning far back in his rocking chair when E.W. reached through his jeans 
and twisted his penis again. (Tr., p.632, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Bird started to pull down E.W.'s 
pants to discipline her, but stopped because he decided it was her parents' job to 
discipline her, not his. (Tr., p.632, Ls.10-15.) Mr. Bird's pants were only halfway zipped 
at the time because he had just washed and dried them and they were too tight to zip 
up all the way, and he did not expect anyone to come to his house so late at night. 
(Tr., p.631, Ls.12-16, p.665, Ls.7-12.) 
The final incident occurred when Mr. Bird was using the bathroom and E.W. was 
sitting on the couch watching TV. (Tr., p.634, Ls.2-8.) Mr. Bird had just finished going 
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to the bathroom when E.W. walked in and asked him if he was finished. (Tr., p.634, 
Ls.9-10.) Mr. Bird replied that he was finished, and E.W. leaned over and kissed his 
penis. (Tr., p.634, Ls.12-13.) Mr. Bird was shocked that this happened and he said that 
he never asked or encouraged E.W. to touch him in any way. (Tr., p.634, Ls.18-25, 
p.639, Ls.15-24.) After this happened, E.W. had a funny look on her face, so Mr. Bird 
kissed her to make her feel better. (Tr., p.676, Ls.14-22.) 
Mr. Bird was charged with one count of lewd conduct with a child for causing or 
allowing E.W. to touch him with her hand or her mouth, and he was charged with one 
count of sexual abuse of a child for turning his body toward E.W. in the bathroom so 
that she could see his penis. (R., pp.166-167.) He pleaded not guilty. (R., pp.34-35.) 
A three-day jury trial began on February 20, 2013. (Tr., p.3, L.6 - p.4, L.12.) Five 
witnesses testified for the State: E.W., Nadia Williams (E.W.'s mother), Stephanie 
Schoen-Orr (E.VV.'s counselor), Shawn Williams (E.W.'s father), and Detective David 
Hope (Rexburg Police Department). E.W. testified that she touched Mr. Bird's penis 
with her hand in the living room and with her hand and her mouth in the bathroom. 
(Tr., p.369, Ls.18-25, p.368, L. 15 - p.369, L. 7.) E.W. also testified that Mr. Bird pulled 
her pants down. (Tr., p.373, p.17-21.) 
Several witnesses testified for the defense, including Mr. Bird. Marji Birch, a 
neighbor of Mr. Bird, testified that E.W. and T.W. were defiant children who refused to 
leave her yard when she asked them to. (Tr., p.542, L.21 - p.545, L.1.) Kenneth 
Waldron, a good friend of Mr. Bird, testified that when he visited Mr. Bird, a little boy 
walked into Mr. Bird's house without knocking and started watching TV. (Tr., p.547, 
L.17 - p.548, L.9.) Gloria Andrus, another neighbor, testified that E.W. and T.W. would 
constantly come to her home and ask for food or candy. (Tr., p.556, Ls.4-16.) 
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Defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony from Ms. Andrus regarding an 
event she witnessed between T.W. and E.W. As an offer of proof, Ms. Andrus stated 
outside the presence of the jury that she saw E.VV., T.W., and another girl playing in 
Ms. Andrus's playhouse and that T.W. had his pants pulled down and she could see his 
buttocks. (Tr., p.559, L.21 - p.560, L.1.) T.W.'s pants and shorts were pulled down 
past his genital area. (Tr., p.560, Ls.1-4.) By the time Ms. Andrus opened her sliding 
door and went outside, T.W. had pulled up his pants, but E.W. and the other girl had 
pulled down their underwear. (Tr., p.560, Ls.5-9.) This incident occurred in August 
2009, which is in the same time frame that the incidents with Mr. Bird occurred. 
(Tr., p.561, Ls.14-18.) Defense counsel stated that the evidence supported the defense 
theory of the case, which was that Mr. Bird did not have any sexual intent toward E.W. 
and did not ask her to touch him, and that she touched him because she was curious. 
(Tr., p.561, L.19 - p.562, L.1.) The State objected that the evidence was prior sexual 
behavior that fell under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412 (hereinafter, Rule 412). 1 
(Tr., p.558, L.24 - 559, L.4.) 
The district court ruled that the proffered testimony was subject to Rule 412, 
which prohibits the admission of reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual 
behavior of an alleged victim of a sex crime. 1.R.E. 412(a). Rule 412 provides for 
particular exceptions2, but an offer of proof must be submitted in writing five days before 
trial. I. R. E. 412( c )( 1 ). The district court further ruled that, even if the time frame for 
submitting an offer of proof were expanded, the conduct was not substantially similar to 
1 The State also objected that the evidence was a prior bad act under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) and that it should not be admitted under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. 
(Tr., p.559, Ls.5-19.) However, the district court did not sustain an objection on either of 
these grounds. (Tr., p.564, Ls.13-24.) 
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the conduct involving Mr. Bird and, therefore, it could not be admitted.3 (Tr., p.564, 
Ls.13-24.) 
The defense then called Mr. Bird's neighbor, Deanne Lindsey, who testified that 
E.W. and T.W. just walked into her house on several occasions. (Tr., p.675, L.21 -
p.580, L.21.) Ronald Lindsey, Deanne Lindsey's husband, testified that he had been 
Mr. Bird's neighbor for 20 years and that Mr. Bird was an admirable person. (Tr., p.585, 
Ls.22-25.) Mr. Lindsey testified that E.W. and T.W. would often come to his house to 
eat and would sometimes refuse to leave when asked. (Tr., p.694, Ls.1-6.) Mr. Lindsey 
also testified that T.VV. and E.W. would jump on him and kiss and hug him even when 
he told them not to. (Tr., p.596, L.19 - p.597, L.2.) Ultimately, the jury acquitted 
Mr. Bird of lewd conduct with a child, but convicted him of sexual abuse of a child. 
(R., p.189.) 
Mr. Bird maintained that he did not have any sexual intent toward E.W. and 
exercised his right to refuse to participate in a psychosexual examination. (PSI, p.10.) 
At sentencing, Defense counsel moved to strike the portion of the PSI that discussed 
Mr. Bird's refusal to participate in the psychosexual evaluation, since Mr. Bird had a 
constitutional right to not participate. (Tr., p.744, L.21 - p.745, L.2.) The district court 
overruled the objection. (Tr., p.745, Ls.11-17.) The State recommended a sentence of 
20 years, with 10 years fixed. (Tr., p.760, Ls.10-13.) Defense counsel recommended 
probation with credit for time served. (Tr., p.756, Ls.16-17.) The district court stated 
2 Defense counsel did not argue that one of the exceptions to Rule 412 applied, but 
rather that the evidence was not subject to Rule 412 at all. 
3 The State did not object on relevance grounds; however, the district court's ruling that 
the evidence was not substantially similar to the charged conduct implied a relevance 
analysis regarding the admission of alternative source evidence. State v. Molen, 148 
Idaho 950, 956 (Ct. App. 2010). 
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that, because Mr. Bird did not participate in the psychosexual examination, it had no 
choice but to conclude that Mr. Bird was a high risk to reoffend. (Tr., p.770, Ls.2-14.) 
The district court then imposed a sentence of 20 years, with 7 years fixed. (Tr., p.774, 
Ls.4-9.) 
Mr. Bird filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.205.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it excluded Ms. Andrus's testimony? 
2. Did the district court violate Mr. Bird's right to due process by increasing his 
sentence because he exercised his constitutional right to refuse to participate in 
the psychosexual examination? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it considered, as an aggravating 
factor, Mr. Bird's refusal to participate in the psychosexual examination, and 
when it imposed upon Mr. Bird a sentence of 20 years, with 7 years fixed? 
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I. 
The District Court Erred When It Excluded Ms. Andrus's Testimony On The Basis That 
It \Nas Precluded By Rule 412, And That It Was Irrelevant Alternative Source Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony from Ms. Andrus regarding an 
incident that she witnessed involving E.W., her older brother, and another neighborhood 
girl. The incident appeared to be an episode of anatomical curiosity, in that E.W.'s 
brother pulled his underwear down in front of E.W. and the other girl, then E.W. and the 
girl pulled their underwear down in of E.W.'s brother. (Tr., 1 
1,L.18.) 
The district ruled that Rule 2 barred admission of the evidence and, 
additionally, it excluded the evidence based upon a finding that the evidence was 
alternative source evidence that was not substantially similar to the alleged conduct by 
Mr. Bird. (Tr., p.564, Ls.10-24, p.572, Ls.12-20.) 
The district court erred when it determined that Rule 412 barred the admission of 
the evidence. The district court also erred when it applied the relevance test for 
alternative source evidence, because the defense did not offer the evidence as 
alternative source evidence. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Determined That The Proffered Testimony Was 
Precluded By Rule 412 
Rule 412 generally prevents the introduction of evidence regarding the past 
sexual behavior of an alleged victim of a sexual offense. In relevant part, Rule 412 
provides: 
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(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which 
a person is accused of a sex crime, reputation or opinion evidence of the 
past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such sex crime is not 
admissible. 
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which 
a person is accused of a sex crime, evidence of a victim's past sexual 
behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, 
unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is -
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2)[4] and 
is constitutionally required to be admitted; or 
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of -
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the 
accused, offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the 
accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the 
source of semen or injury; or 
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by 
the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim 
consented to the sexual behavior with respect to which the sex 
crime is alleged; or 
(C) false allegations of sex crimes made at an earlier time; or 
(D) sexual behavior with parties other than the accused 
which occurred at the time of the event giving rise to the sex crime 
charged. 
I.R.E. 412. Therefore, in order for Rule 412 to apply, the proffered evidence must be 
either "reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim" 
or "evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior." I.R.E. 412(a),(b). 
Here, the evidence does is not reputation or opinion evidence of past sexual 
conduct by E.W. In fact, it is not evidence of past sexual conduct of anyone. E.W. was 
only four years old when the event in the playhouse occurred and her brother was only 
4 Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) concern the requirements of pre-trial notice and a 
hearing. 
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five years old. It would be absurd to categorize nudity between children of this age as 
sexual behavior. Rather, this incident speaks only to whether E.W. had seen male 
anatomy before and may have been curious about it Because the evidence was not 
sexual behavior by E.W., the district court erred when it determined that Rule 412 
barred the admission of Ms. Andrus's testimony. 
C. The Evidence Was Not Offered As Alternative Source Evidence And, Therefore, 
The District Court Erred When It Excluded It Based On A Relevance Standard 
That Only Applies To Alternative Source Evidence 
The district court also excluded Ms. Andrus's testimony based upon a finding that 
it was not substantially similar to the alleged conduct. (Tr., p.564, Ls.18-22.) Although 
the district court did not specifically make a relevance ruling, the "substantially similar" 
test is used to determine the relevance and admissibility of alternative source evidence. 
In order to be admissible, "alternative source evidence must demonstrate the child's 
experience of or exposure to sexual behavior sufficiently similar to that which the child 
has described in her allegations against the defendant." State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 
956 (Ct. App. 2010) (ultimately holding that the evidence was properly excluded 
because the events that the child witnessed were not similar to her allegations and, 
therefore, the evidence was not relevant). 
Here, Ms. Andrus's testimony was not offered as alternative source evidence and 
was not required to be substantially similar to the alleged conduct. In his offer of proof 
regarding Ms. Andrus's testimony, defense counsel stated: 
So it's relevant in that it's close to the time; so it's late August of 2009. 
The allegations against Mr. Bird are anywhere from April of 2009 to 
September 2009. So it's in the same time frame. It would confirm 
Mr. Bird's statements to the police about the child being sexually curious, 
and so that confirms what the State has presented and what I'm sure 
they're going to argue, that she had no way of knowing what genitalia was 
at the age of four. So her statement rebuts the State's assertion that this 
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girl was lured or commanded by Mr. Bird to do certain things. Her 
statements are not prior sexual contact by her, and so that doesn't fit 
under 412 as far as trying to prove that she was sexually mischievous. 
However, it does show that she had been exposed to, at least by 
Ms. Andrus's testimony, exposure from her brother. 
(Tr., p.561, L.14-p.562, L.6.) 
The facts of this case are rather unique in that Mr. Bird did not claim that the 
contact did not occur, or that E.W. was fabricating the entire incident. The defense's 
theory of the case was that E.W. was simply a curious four-year-old child, and that she 
touched Mr. Bird's penis without his permission or coercion because she had seen a 
penis before and was curious about it. (Tr., p.561, Ls.19-25.) The fact that Ms. Andrus 
saw E.W., her brother, and another little girl pulling their underwear down in front of 
each other supports the defense theory of the case. In this context, the evidence is not 
required to be substantially conforming because it is not offered to show that E.W. 
acquired sexual knowledge from another source and then fabricated the allegations. 
Rather, it is merely relevant to the question of whether or not E.W. was curious about 
male anatomy, causing her to touch Mr. Bird and corroborating Mr. Bird's defense that 
he did not ask E.W. to touch him 
The district court erred when it excluded the evidence under Rule 412 because 
Rule 412 does not apply. The district court further erred by determining that the 
evidence was alternative source evidence that required substantial similarity to the 
charged conduct. As such, this Court should vacate Mr. Bird's conviction, and remand 
this matter for a new trial. See State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 240 (2009) (where 
district court applies wrong standard in excluding defense evidence, the remedy is to 
vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial). 
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11. 
The District Court Violated Mr. Bird's Right To Due Process By Increasing His Sentence 
Because He Exercised His Constitutional Right To Refuse To Participate In The 
Psychosexual Examination 
Mr. Bird, like all defendants, has a constitutional right against self-incrimination. 
A defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies both at the 
sentencing hearing and in presentence evaluations. See State v. Estrada, 143 Idaho 
558, 563 (2006); State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 297 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Mr. Bird exercised his right to not participate in the psychosexual evaluation. 
(PSI, p.8.) Among other things, the psychosexual evaluation places a defendant in 
specific risk categories. (Tr., p. 769, Ls.13-15.) At sentencing, defense counsel moved 
to strike the portion of the PSI that discussed Mr. Bird's refusal to participate in the 
psychosexual evaluation. (Tr., p.744, L.21 - p.745, L.2.) The district court overruled 
the objection. (Tr., p.745, Ls.11-17.) Later in the sentencing hearing, Mr. Bird, the 
district court, based solely on Mr. Bird's refusal to participate in the psychosexual 
evaluation, placed him in the high risk category, stating: "But, in this case, I don't have 
enough information about your sexual history and have to, in fulfilling my obligation to 
protect society, put you at a high risk of reoffending with this type of crime in the future. 
Because I don't have any other information." (Tr., p.770, Ls.7-11.) The district court 
went on to impose a lengthy prison sentence. (Tr., p.774, Ls.4-9.) 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases make it clear that no 
defendant can be punished for exercising a constitutional right. "[W]hile an individual 
certainly may be penalized for violating the law, he just as certainly may not be 
punlshed for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right." United States v. 
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982). These cases also leave no doubt that such 
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punishment is a violation of due process. 'To punish a person because he has done 
what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort , . 
. . " Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,363 (1978); accord North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 
(1989); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). 
Idaho appellate courts will consider a claim of error to which no objection was 
made below if the issue rises to the level of fundamental error. See State v. Field, 144 
Idaho 559 (2007). Here, although an objection was made to the inclusion of PSI 
evaluator's discussion of Mr. Bird's refusal to participate in the psychosexual evaluation, 
a separate objection was not made at the time that the district court placed Mr. Bird in a 
high risk category and increased his sentence for exercising his right. In State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court held that an appellate court 
should reverse an unobjected-to error if: (1) the alleged error violates an unwaived 
constitutional right; (2) the error is plain and obvious from the record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; and, (3) the 
defendant establishes that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id. 
Here, the district court's use of Mr. Bird's exercise of his constitutional right as an 
aggravating factor in sentencing satisfies this test. First, Mr. Bird alleges a 
constitutional violation by arguing that the district court violated his right to due process 
by punishing him for exercising his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record; the district court said, in 
response to Mr. Bird's refusal to participate in the evaluation, "I don't have enough 
information about your sexual history and have to, in fulfilling my obligation to protect 
society, put you at a high risk of reoffending with this type of crime in the future. 
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(Tr., p.770, Ls.7-11.) And finally, the error clearly affected the outcome of the 
proceedings because the district court discussed, at length, that Mr. Bird was a high risk 
to society and did not provide any other basis for this categorization other than 
Mr. Bird's refusal to participate in the psychosexual evaluation. (Tr., p.769, L.13 -
p.770, L.21.) 
The right to not participate in the psychosexual evaluation is eviscerated if, as a 
result of exercising that right, a person is automatically categorized as a high risk and is 
sentenced more harshly. Here, the district court did not cite a single other reason for 
why it believed that Mr. Bird was a high risk to reoffend. To the contrary, Mr. Bird's 
complete lack of criminal history (PSI, p.5), his age (PSI, p.1 ), his health problems (PSI, 
p.7), the fact that he has lived in the same town his entire life (PSI, p.6), his financial 
stability (PSI, p.9), his relationships with age-appropriate women (PSI, p.6), the fact that 
he does not abuse drugs or alcohol (PSI, p.8), and the fact that he does not have a 
mental illness (PSI, p.8) all refute the district court's conclusion that he is a high risk to 
reoffend. 
The district court violated Mr. Bird's due process rights by punishing him for 
exercising his right against self-incrimination. Therefore, Mr. Bird is entitled to a new 
sentencing hearing. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Considered, As An Aggravating Factor 
Mr. Bird's Refusal To Participate In The Psychosexual Evaluation, And When It 
Imposed An Excessive Sentence 
Mr. Bird is described by his long-time neighbor as an admirable person. 
(Tr., p.858, Ls.23-25.) Based on the facts of this case, Mr. Bird's unified sentence of 20 
years, with 7 years fixed, is excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals 
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of sentencing. Further, the district court abused its discretion when it considered, as an 
aggravating factor, Mr. Bird's refusal to participate in the psychosexual evaluation. 
When there is a claim that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, 
the appellate court will conduct an independent examination of the record giving 
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Independent appellate sentencing examinations are based on an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). When a sentence is 
unreasonable based on the facts of the case, it is an abuse of discretion. State v. Nice, 
103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982). Unless it appears that confinement was necessary "to 
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the 
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case," a 
sentence is unreasonable. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Here, the district court concluded, based solely on Mr. Bird's refusal to participate 
in the psychosexual evaluation, that he was a high risk to society: "So when we deal 
with undue risk, I can't say that there is an undue risk that you will not commit any 
further crimes. Just the opposite: There is a high risk that this crime could be committed 
again." (Tr., p.770, Ls.18-21.) The district court further explained that it was going to 
"err on the side of protecting society and the community." (Tr., p.770, Ls.12-13.) The 
district court abused its discretion when it improperly categorized Mr. Bird as a high risk 
to society, and used this categorization as an aggravating factor. The trial court has 
broad discretion in sentencing, but it cannot make a baseless conclusion that a person 
is a high risk to society and impose a prison sentence based on that conclusion. 
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Not only is there no evidence that Mr. Bird is a high risk to society, the facts 
support the opposite conclusion. Mr. Bird is 82 years old and has no prior criminal 
convictions. (PSI, pp.1, 5.) He has been an upstanding citizen all of his life. He 
graduated from Rexburg High School and has lived in Rexburg ever since, except for 
when he was serving his country in the Air Force. (PSI, pp.5-6.) He served in the Air 
Force between 1948 and 1952 and was stationed in the Pacific during the Korean War. 
(PSI, p.7.) Further, Mr. Bird suffers from diabetes and uses insulin several times a day. 
(PSI, p.7.) He has had six heart bypass surgeries. (PSI, p.7.) 
Mr. Bird is exactly the type of person who would be successful on probation. In 
82 years, he has not had a single criminal conviction other than the current offense. 
(PSI, p.5.) He does not drink or use drugs. (PSI, p.8.) He is financially stable and 
collects social security and a retirement pension. (PSI, p.3.) Any danger he poses to 
the public is significantly curtailed by his age and physical limitations. (PSI, pp.1, 7.) As 
a result of this conviction, he will be required to register as a sex offender and will be 
strictly supervised. By imposing such a lengthy prison sentence, the district court has 
ensured that Mr. Bird will mostly likely die in prison. The facts do not support such a 
sentence. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it considered an 
improper aggravating factor and when it imposed an excessive sentence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bird respectfully requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and his 
case remanded for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that his case 'be remanded to 
the district court for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that this Court 
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2015. 
MBERL YE. SMITH 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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